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The recovery of John Milton’s De Doctrina christiana in 1823 from the Old State Paper Office in Whitehall, where the manuscript lay forgotten for nearly 150 years, led to a scandalous 
revelation: the great Protestant poet and tireless champion of En glish 
republicanism maintained a host of heterodox views, including one of 
the most ancient and reviled Christian heresies, Arianism.1 Arians re-
ject the Athanasian conception of the Trinity and hold that the Son of 
God is a finite being, generated in time, whose exalted status depends 
on the will of the Father. Defined and anathematized in the fourth cen-
tury, this anti- Trinitarian heresy gained new traction in the late sev-
enteenth century among moral and natural philosophers—Locke and 
Newton are the best- known examples—committed to the historically 
rigorous interpretation of scripture and to the rational formulation of 
religious doctrine. Since the nineteenth century, critics committed to 
the orthodoxy of Milton and his epic have sought to protect the poet 
from his own deeply held religious views by minimizing the relation 
between Paradise Lost and his theological treatise (his “dearest and 
best possession” [De doctrina 121]). The recent attempt to exclude De 
doctrina from the Miltonic canon is a particularly vivid example of this 
strategy at work.2 But the heretical Christology that Milton takes pains 
to articulate and defend in De doctrina is crucial to our understanding 
of Paradise Lost. By embracing Arianism and deemphasizing the spec-
tacle of the Crucifixion in his theory of salvation, or soteriology, Milton 
breaks with two definitive theological tenets that have been central to 
Christianity ever since it became a state religion under Constantine.3 
These heresies constitute the theological underpinnings of his radical 
republicanism, which upholds an idea of human dignity and agency 
antithetical to the tyrannical politics of torture and blood sacrifice.
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This heterodox view of the Son and his 
sacrifice finds its cosmological counter-
part in an infinite universe with a plurality 
of worlds. In book 3 of Paradise Lost, Satan 
soars through the newly created universe
Amongst innumerable Stars, that shone 
Stars distant, but nigh hand seem’d other  
  Worlds, 
Or other Worlds they seem’d, or happy Isles, 
Like those Hesperian Gardens fam’d of old, 
Fortunate Fields, and Groves and flow’ry 
  Vales, 
Thrice happy Isles, but who dwelt happy there 
He stay’d not to enquire. (lines 565–71)
Intent on reaching earth, the “happy Isle” 
of Adam and Eve, Satan leaves these other 
“happy Isles” unexplored (2.410). But the 
provocative simile that compares these “other 
Worlds” to “Hesperian Gardens” invites us 
to imagine other garden- bound inhabitants 
who may or may not be constrained by their 
own forbidden fruit. Later, of course, Raphael 
warns Adam, “Dream not of other Worlds, 
what Creatures there / Live, in what state, 
condition, or degree” (8.175–76). His point 
is not that such worlds do not exist—indeed, 
he has just introduced Adam to the possibil-
ity that they do—but that Adam should leave 
such matters to God and enjoy his own lot. 
Instead of closing off speculation, however, 
the alliterative emphasis of Raphael’s warning 
(“joy thou / In what he gives to thee, this Par-
adise / And thy fair Eve” [170–72]) encourages 
us to believe that the universe contains other 
paradises and, perhaps, other Eves.
Fueled by the publication of Copernicus’s 
De revolutionibus (1543), early modern con-
jecture about a plurality of inhabited worlds 
carried with it disturbing theological impli-
cations. As early as 1549, the Lutheran hu-
manist Philip Melanchthon formulated the 
principal objection:
There is one Son of God, our Lord Jesus 
Christ, who, when he had gone forth into this 
world, died only once and was resurrected. He 
did not show himself elsewhere; neither did he 
die nor was he resurrected elsewhere. There-
fore, it should not be imagined that there are 
many worlds, and because of this, it should 
not be imagined that Christ died and was of-
ten resurrected. Nor must it be thought that 
in any other world, without knowledge of the 
Son of God, men are restored to eternal life.4
Note the emphasis on singularity here: there 
is only one Son of God, and he sacrificed 
himself only once for the inhabitants of the 
one and only created world. The cumulative 
effect of these assertions is to insist that there 
is only one route to salvation. It leads through 
the Passion and encompasses everyone. Belief 
in the existence of other worlds, Melanchthon 
fears, would undermine orthodox Christo-
centric doctrine. Speculation about other 
redeemers and other redemptive acts would 
diminish the centrality and universal scope 
of Christ’s sacrifice and of the atonement. 
Moreover, it would raise questions about why 
an omnipotent deity who created and gov-
erns a multitude of inhabited worlds chose 
to be incarnated, crucified, and resurrected 
on this one. Thomas Paine, who accepted the 
existence of other worlds, demonstrates that 
Melanchthon was right to worry. “To believe 
that God created a plurality of worlds at least 
as numerous as what we call stars,” he argues 
in The Age of Reason, Part I (1794), “renders 
the Christian system of faith at once little 
and ridiculous and scatters it in the mind like 
feathers in the air. The two beliefs cannot be 
held together in the same mind; and he who 
thinks that he believes in both has thought 
but little of either” (303).
Milton would have disagreed. Instead 
of seeing the possibility of other worlds as a 
threat to his faith, he found reassurance in it. 
In Paradise Lost, he repeatedly turns our at-
tention to this possibility: invoking Galileo’s 
telescope observations, the narrator implies 
that the moon may be another earth (1.287–
91, 5.261–63); Raphael’s f light “between 
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worlds and worlds” reinforces the likelihood 
that the stars of our universe are other worlds 
(5.268); and although Satan’s Lucretian claim 
that “Space may produce new Worlds” is mis-
leading, it reminds us that God can raise more 
universes out of Chaos, if he chooses (1.650). 
Yet Milton scholars, more focused on whether 
he leans toward a Ptolemaic or Copernican 
cosmos, tend to deflect or dismiss the theolog-
ical implications of his universe. For instance, 
Harinder Singh Marjara suggests that Milton 
was drawn to “a universe that flew in the face 
of Aristotelianism and Christian orthodoxy” 
merely because of “its poetic possibilities” 
(80). But Milton’s cosmos accommodates his 
heterodox theology. The idea of a plurality 
of worlds exerts two contrary pressures on 
the Trinity: it exalts the omnipotence of the 
creator, while it limits the significance of the 
redeemer. In effect, it produces a tension best 
resolved by rejecting the dogma of the Trin-
ity and adopting the Arian belief that God the 
Father and the Son of God are two distinct 
beings—the former uncreated, infinite, and 
immutable and the latter created, finite, and 
changeable. In De doctrina Christiana, Milton 
takes this heretical view, declaring it “more 
clearly deducible from the text of the scrip-
ture than the currently accepted doctrine” 
(203), and in Paradise Lost he situates the Fa-
ther (“Omnipotent, / Immutable, Immortal, 
Infinite, / Eternal King” [3.372–74]) and the 
Son (“of all Creation first, / Begotten Son, Di-
vine Similitude” [383–84]) in a cosmos that 
many of his contemporaries found incompat-
ible with their orthodox Trinitarian God.
Whereas others took comfort in the idea 
of one world governed by a single Christian 
doctrine, Milton embraced God’s infinite 
power to create and celebrated the multiplic-
ity of that creation. Indeed, his poetic uni-
verse can be seen as a cosmic correlative of his 
views on intellectual freedom and religious 
tolerance. In Areopagitica (1644), he suggests 
that truth “may have more shapes then one,” 
subverting claims predicated on the assump-
tion that there is only one world because there 
is only one path to salvation (563). Likewise, 
the cosmos that Milton hints at in Paradise 
Lost reflects the views on tolerance and non-
conformity that he sets out in Of True Religion 
(1673): his rejection of a single, monolithic 
church that subsumes both political and 
ecclesiastical power in favor of a plurality of 
religious sects corresponds to his preference 
for a plurality of worlds. He maintains that 
Protestant sects as divergent as Lutherans, 
Calvinists, Anabaptists, Arians, Socinians, 
and Arminians have been taught by the di-
vine Spirit “all things absolutely necessary to 
salvation” (424). Throughout his later writ-
ings, from Areopagitica onward, Milton tends 
to destabilize political, religious, and intel-
lectual monopolies by dispersing power and 
authority to multiple sites. Instead of a single, 
divinely ordained monarch, for instance, Mil-
ton invests political authority in all men: “No 
man who knows ought, can be so stupid to 
deny that all men were borne free, being the 
image and resemblance of God himself.”5
By stressing the possibility of other “Hes-
perian Gardens” in Paradise Lost, Milton does 
exactly what Melanchthon fears and dislodges 
Christ’s sacrifice from its central position, 
both cosmically and theologically. By em-
bracing Arianism, he goes even further and 
redefines the nature of that sacrifice. God—
or, rather, the second person of the Christian 
Godhead—no longer dies on the cross; the Son 
of God, a created being distinct from the one 
true God, dies instead. In Paradise Lost, then, 
cosmology and theology converge to trans-
form the significance of the Son’s sacrifice for 
humankind and thus the relation between the 
Father, the Son, and the individual believer. 
As I will argue later, Milton enlists the classi-
cal friendship tradition to help him recast the 
sacrifice as an ethical decision, shifting our at-
tention from Christ’s suffering on the cross to 
the Son’s heroic offer to die for Man. This tra-
dition provides him with examples of friends 
whose sublime devotion and self- sacrifice 
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provide a new model for the bond between 
redeemer and redeemed. I am not claiming 
that Milton’s fascination with other worlds 
compelled him to become an Arian. Rather, 
the Arianism that he adopted through his 
own reading of scripture allowed him to move 
past his vexed relation to the Crucifixion and 
imagine the poetic universe that we recognize 
as distinctively his own. Reflecting on the her-
esies of De doctrina Christiana, William Ker-
rigan convincingly concludes, “Milton bent 
his religion into conformity with himself ” 
(166). Nowhere is this more true, I would ar-
gue, than in his heretical view of the Son.
The Crucifixion
More than two decades before he began work 
on De doctrina in the mid to late 1650s, Milton 
displays a resistance to the Passion, and espe-
cially the Crucifixion, that separates him from 
mainstream Protestantism and points toward 
his future heterodoxy. Protestant reflection on 
the Passion of Christ tended to prompt emo-
tional responses—frequently a profound sense 
of sinfulness and depravity linked to worth-
lessness, helplessness, and dejection—antithet-
ical to Milton’s sense of himself. Examining 
the role of Calvinist Passion narratives in 
early modern En gland, Debora Shuger avers 
“these texts attempt to produce a specific ver-
sion of Christian selfhood—a divided selfhood 
gripped by intense, contradictory emotions,” 
and she finds that “Christ’s agony provided 
the primary symbol for early modern specu-
lation on selfhood and society. The tortured 
and torturing males who supply the dramatis 
personae of the Crucifixion . . . haunt the inte-
rior landscape of the Puritan automachia” (9, 
127). Michael Schoen feldt draws similar con-
clusions about the role of Christ’s sacrifice in 
devotional poetry. Poems by Donne, Herbert, 
and Milton, he contends, look at the Passion 
“through squinting eyes amid slumping pos-
tures, as if they were glimpsing a trauma too 
immense for human comprehension” (562). 
Instead of dwelling on the actual Crucifixion, 
they focus on their inability to respond to it. 
“The fitting object of sacrifice,” he writes, “is 
the tacitly arrogant self that would claim to 
be able to respond appropriately to this event” 
(564).  Schoen feldt makes a compelling case 
for Donne and Herbert. But Milton provides 
him with a much more limited example: the 
incomplete eight- stanza poem “The Passion,” 
which Milton attempted after his successful 
ode “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity.” 
Nonetheless, Schoen feldt suggests that “The 
Passion” “offers a formal version of the stutter-
ing inability to respond to Christ’s sacrifice” 
and concludes that for Milton, as for Donne 
and Herbert, “Christ’s sacrifice ultimately de-
feats poetry” (581).
But Milton would rarely concede de-
feat in anything. Indeed, throughout all his 
works, nothing is more rare than admissions 
of inability or failure. At times, his confidence 
in his own abilities seems almost limitless. In 
his poem Mansus (1638–39), the young, un-
known Milton imagines himself, after “no 
silent career,” being rewarded for the brilliant 
literary works he has yet to write:
So I should rest in perfect peace. Then, if 
there be such a thing as faith and assured re-
wards of the righteous, I myself, far remote 
in the ethereal homes of the gods who dwell 
in heaven, whither labor and a pure mind 
and ardent virtue lead, shall look down upon 
these events—as much as the fates permit—
from some part of that mysterious world, and 
with a serene spirit and a face suffused with 
smiles and rosy light, I shall congratulate my-
self on ethereal Olympus. (lines 86, 93–100)
In The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce 
(1643), Milton depicts himself as leading us 
out of a “labyrinth of servitude,” a feat that 
places his contribution to “civill and human 
life” above that of “the inventors of wine and 
oyl” (240). There are famous expressions of 
doubt and anxiety scattered throughout his 
poetry, such as his fear that “an age too late, 
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or cold / Climate, or Years” might undermine 
his epic ambitions (Paradise Lost 9.44–45). 
But these expressions tend to foreground 
rather than diminish his aspirations and ac-
complishments. If Milton had wanted to make 
Christ’s agony central to his poetics, he would 
have found a way to do so. “The truth,” as 
J. H. Hanford observed long ago, “is that the 
Crucifixion was not a congenial theme to him 
at any time. Even thus early he seems to have 
felt instinctively that man’s salvation depends 
upon himself and that he needs Christ as a 
guide and model rather than as a redeemer” 
(145). Instead of linking Milton to Donne and 
Herbert, his unfinished poem on the Passion 
already marks his distance from them.
Throughout his life, Milton rejects the 
model of reformed selfhood that seeks to in-
stall the Crucifixion as its central scene. As a 
poet, he stands and waits; he does not squint 
or slouch. His unwillingness to assume the 
prostrate position of a fallen creature strug-
gling to accept its own unworthiness helps ex-
plain the success of the Nativity Ode and the 
failure of “The Passion.” In the ode, the poet 
harmonizes his inspired voice with “the Angel 
Choir” so seamlessly that he never needs to 
speak in the first- person singular (line 27). He 
observes that Christ will release “our deadly 
forfeit,” bringing about “[o]ur great redemp-
tion,” glorification, and bliss, but he is more 
preoccupied with Christ’s heroics than with 
human depravity (6, 4). When the proleptic 
fantasy that the Incarnation will immediately 
destroy sin and restore “the age of gold” is cut 
short by the recognition that this infant “on 
the bitter cross / Must redeem our loss,” the 
poem quickly recasts Christ as a Herculean 
figure conquering Satan and his minions from 
the cradle: “Our Babe, to show his Godhead 
true, / Can in his swaddling bands control the 
damned crew” (135, 152–53, 227–28). In the 
final stanza, a peaceful image of the sleeping 
child (“the Virgin blest, / Hath laid her Babe 
to rest”) is qualified by a description of the 
angels prepared for battle: “And all about the 
Courtly Stable, / Bright- harness’d Angels sit in 
order serviceable” (237–38, 243–44). The poet 
who joined their choir does not break ranks 
to rejoin the nameless multitude of fallen hu-
manity; he waits for his call to arms as well.
The unity of the Nativity Ode—the heroic 
infant and his militant followers biding time 
before the final battle—eludes Milton when 
he attempts to compose a companion piece on 
the Passion. He can no longer share the per-
spective of the angelic host, who have no part 
in the atonement. He now sings in a solitary 
human voice: “For now to sorrow must I tune 
my song, / And set my Harp to notes of sad-
dest woe” (8–9). His Christ remains Hercu-
lean, so much so that it is hard to imagine this 
“Most perfect Hero, tried in heaviest plight / 
Of labors huge and hard, too hard for human 
wight” dying on the cross, especially since 
his human identity is described as merely “a 
Mask” and “disguise” for his omnipotence 
(13–14, 19). But the real problem is the rest-
less, self- conscious speaker, who is unable to 
approach the subject with sufficient humility. 
The supplicant posture and inner torment of 
a creature implicated in the horrific death of 
its loving savior and unworthy of the redemp-
tion that it hopes to receive seem utterly alien 
to him. Although he claims that his “sorrows 
are too dark for day to know,” they do not 
impair him in any way (33). Nor does Milton 
relinquish the heroic tropes that are his po-
etic signature: the prophetic status (“See, see 
the Chariot and those rushing wheels, / That 
whirl’d the Prophet up at Chebar flood” [36–
37]), rapt visions (“There doth my soul in holy 
vision sit / In pensive trance” [41–42]), winged 
flight (“I thence hurried on viewless wings” 
[50]), and Orphic powers (“I . . . / Might think 
th’infection of my sorrows loud / Had got a 
race of mourners” [54–56]). The poem ends 
prematurely because Milton refuses to make 
the sacrifice that the genre requires: he will 
not adopt a poetic identity that rejects per-
sonal heroism and dwells despairingly on his 
own status as a fallen creature.
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This authorial stance is not simply youth-
ful idealism or evidence of an immaturity that 
Milton later outgrows. As Stephen Fallon has 
demonstrated, Milton’s tendency to view him-
self “as heroically virtuous, divinely chosen, 
and untouched by frailty” emerges in many, if 
not most, of his works, and it shapes the sote-
riology of De doctrina and Paradise Lost (118). 
When forced to “contemplat[e] despair and 
alienation” in his divorce tracts, for instance, 
Milton “immediately . . . reasserts his freedom 
from all varieties of imperfection, and thus 
implicitly dissociates himself from the fall” 
(120). What Milton avoids here are precisely 
the feelings that Protestant reflection on the 
Passion seeks to provoke: alienation and de-
spair that lead to the denigration of oneself.
Dwelling on Christ’s sacrifice, as Her-
bert does in The Temple, foregrounds the un-
bridgeable ontological gulf that divides the 
redeemer and the redeemed in Christian or-
thodoxy, and it reminds individual believers 
of their impaired state as fallen beings and the 
irreparable debt that they owe the redeemer. 
This emphasis yields poems like Herbert’s 
“Love (III),” where the speaker must come to 
terms with his own utter unworthiness as he 
learns to passively accept love that he cannot 
deserve. Milton never courts this type of self-
 reflection. He expresses a profound sense of 
debt to God: he is fully aware of himself “as a 
creature, something made, circumscribed, fi-
nite,” who has an obligation to refine and per-
fect himself as an instrument of God’s glory 
(Rumrich, Matter 45). But it is a debt that he 
owes to the creator, not the redeemer, and an 
obligation that all created beings share. Thus, 
this debt foregrounds ontological continuity, 
placing human beings—and Milton in partic-
ular—in the same category as the angels and 
the first created being, the Son of God. All can 
be active, heroic servants of God the Father: 
Milton, who learns to “stand and wait” in son-
net 19; the serviceable angels of the Nativity 
Ode; and Jesus as he stands atop the “highest 
pinnacle” in Paradise Regained (4.549). So un-
like Herbert, who places Christ’s sacrifice at 
the center of his poetics, Milton traces his po-
etic power back to God’s power as creator. In 
his preparation for his prophetic role in Para-
dise Lost, the blind bard implores the divine 
Spirit for a rebirth that echoes the first act of 
creation: “What in me is dark / Illumine, what 
is low raise and support” (1.22–23).
Milton refuses to internalize the Crucifix-
ion—and thus rejects the normative model of 
Protestant subjectivity that Shuger describes—
because of his own sense of dignity. As Rich-
ard Strier observes, Milton “never sustainedly 
adopted the Reformation understanding of 
humility” and “does not consistently partici-
pate in the Reformation attack on the dignity 
of man as a rational and (potentially) self-
 governing creature” (268, 280).6 What passes 
for Christian humility, Milton asserts in Of 
Reformation (1641), is often servility: “men . . . 
knew not how to hide their Slavish approach 
to Gods behests by them not understood, nor 
worthily receav’d, but by cloaking their Ser-
vile crouching to all Religious Presentments, 
somtimes lawfull, sometimes Idolatrous, un-
der the name of humility” (522). Before the 
“dreadfull Idol” of the Catholic mass, de-
ceived men prefer “a foolish Sacrifice” instead 
of “a savory obedience to Christs example” 
(523). Dignity is Milton’s rallying cry in the 
cause of human freedom. Although man is 
“created after Gods owne Image,” “nothing 
now adayes is more degenerately forgott’n,” he 
laments in Tetrachordon (1645), “then the true 
dignity of man” (587). This ingrained sense of 
dignity leads Milton away from the Crucifix-
ion and toward the Arian Christology of De 
doctrina and Paradise Lost.
An Arian Son
Milton often seems more like the intellectual 
heir of Italian humanists like Pico della Mi-
randola than of reformers like Luther or Cal-
vin—more enthralled by human possibility 
than human limitation. He would certainly 
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have recognized the limitations of Pico’s eu-
phoric fantasy that man could be “maker and 
molder” of himself: divorced from God, belief 
in one’s own agency is fundamentally satanic 
(225). But he never surrendered his belief that 
a “clear spirit” who “live[d] laborious days” 
could accomplish something if he recognized 
God as the source of his identity and power 
and acted not for himself but for God’s glory 
(Lycidas, lines 70, 72). The Arian position on 
the Son of God enables Milton to retain the 
ontological mobility that fascinated Renais-
sance humanists and incorporate it into his 
theology. Rejecting the orthodox formulation 
that the Son shares the Father’s immutable, 
unbegotten, and infinite essence, Milton con-
ceives of the Son as a created being (“the first 
of created things”) subject to time, change, 
and choice: “God begot the Son as a result 
of his own decree . . . within the bounds of 
time” (De doctrina 206, 209). Since they “are 
not one in essence,” their relation depends on 
the harmony or concord between their wills: 
“they are one in that they speak and act as 
one. . . . [The Son] and the Father are one in 
the same way as we are one with him: that is, 
not in essence but in love, in communion, in 
agreement, in charity, in spirit, and finally 
in glory” (220). The Father rewards the Son 
for his voluntary obedience to God’s will by 
increasing his power and prestige and by be-
stowing his divine attributes on him: “the Son 
admits that he possesses whatever measure of 
Deity is attributed to him, by virtue of the pe-
culiar gift and kindness of the Father” (223). 
Like all created beings, the Son has the free-
dom to make moral choices, and by choosing 
to obey the will of God in Paradise Lost, he as-
cends upward until, anointing him “universal 
King,” the Father bestows on him the ultimate 
reward: “all Power, / I give thee, reign for ever, 
and assume / Thy Merits” (3.317–20).
The Son’s identity as a created being 
changes his redemptive role: it is his exem-
plary obedience to God, not his unique es-
sence, that reconciles God and Man. By 
making the redeemer a creature, Arianism 
elevates the status and exalts the potential of 
all created beings. “The central point in the 
Arian system,” Robert Gregg and Dennis 
Groh conclude in their study of early Arian 
soteriology, “is that Christ gains and holds his 
sonship in the same way as other creatures—
thus it is asserted that what is predicated of 
the redeemer can and must be predicated 
of the redeemed” (67). Throughout De doc-
trina, Milton concurs, stressing that other 
creatures bear the same relation to God that 
the Son does. Against those who claim that 
the Son is the supreme god because he is “at 
times called God and even Jehovah,” Milton 
responds “that the name ‘God’ is, by the will 
and permission of God the Father, not infre-
quently bestowed even upon angels and men. 
. . . This is done to show us that angels or mes-
sengers, even though they may seem to take 
upon themselves, when they speak, the name 
and character of God, do not speak their own 
words but those specified by God, who sent 
them” (233, 237). As “the first born among 
many brothers,” the Son may be closer to God 
than other creatures are, but he is not differ-
ent in kind (Colossians 1.15; qtd. in 211).
From this perspective, the Passion does 
not represent God as sacrificing himself for 
Man; it demonstrates the obedience of a per-
fect creature to the will of God. For Milton, 
to make Christ the principal object of devo-
tion, either through ritual or psychological 
reenactment, would be to worship a creature, 
not the creator. “The ultimate object of faith is 
not Christ, the Mediator,” he insists, “but God 
the Father. . . . So it does not seem surpris-
ing that there are a lot of Jews, and Gentiles 
too, who are saved although they believed 
or believe in God alone, either because they 
lived before Christ or because, even though 
they have lived after him, he has not been 
revealed to them” (475). Humbling yourself 
before the Crucifixion, deliberately sacrific-
ing your dignity and agency, as Donne and 
Herbert do, would be placing a servile idol-
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atry before a “savory obedience to Christs 
example,” which is obedience to God. As Mi-
chael tells Adam, the Messiah will destroy Sa-
tan’s works “by fulfilling that which [Adam] 
didst want, / Obedience to the Law of God” 
(Paradise Lost 12.396–97). Instead of receiv-
ing special attention, the Crucifixion—deftly 
converted into an act of triumphant heroism 
(“nail’d to the Cross / By his own Nation, 
slain for bringing Life; / But to the Cross he 
nails thy Enemies” [413–15])—is folded into 
the history of the Son’s return to “[h]is seat at 
God’s right hand,” the Second Coming, and 
the final transformation of Earth into “Para-
dise, far happier place / Than this of Eden” 
(457, 464–65). Although he learns that the re-
deemer will suffer and die for his transgres-
sion, Adam does not make the martyrdom 
the focus of his devotion. He praises God the 
Father as the ultimate source of goodness, 
and Michael does not correct him.
Heroic Choice
Milton can relegate Christ’s sacrifice to a few 
lines toward the end of Paradise Lost because 
he has already depicted the Son’s definitive act 
of obedience and love. “Virtually, and insofar 
as the efficacy of his action is concerned,” he 
writes in De doctrina, Christ “offered himself 
from the very beginning of the world” (434). 
By focusing on the Son’s offer to die for Man 
rather than on Christ’s fulfillment of that 
pledge, Milton substitutes a voluntary decision 
for the spectacular suffering of the Passion. 
Instead of passive acceptance and corporeal 
martyrdom, this revision allows him to pre-
sent active collaboration with God’s will—the 
ability to discern it and the deliberate choice 
to obey it—as the central heroic act of the epic. 
Milton locates this offer in the larger context 
of a trial: peering down from “his prospect 
high, / Wherein past, present, future he be-
holds,” the Father vindicates himself and 
condemns the fallen angels and Man for their 
transgressions (Paradise Lost 3.77–78). He 
clears himself of responsibility by citing the 
freedom with which he has endowed his crea-
tures (“Sufficient to have stood, though free to 
fall” [99–101]) and pronounces two different 
sentences: “Man falls deceiv’d / By th’ other 
first: Man therefore shall find grace / The other 
none” (130–32). Thus, “in Mercy and Justice 
both” his glory will “excel, / But Mercy first 
and last shall brightest shine” (132–34).
But what is true for Man and the angels 
is true for the Son as well: to please his father, 
he must be free to obey or disobey and offer 
his life for Man or not. As the Father affirms,
What pleasure I from such obedience paid, 
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d, 
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity, 
Not mee. (107–11)
This judicial encounter between God and 
Man presents a test for the Son: like Adam in 
book 8, he must demonstrate that he knows 
both himself and God and can fathom what 
it means to be the Father’s most perfect image 
and “chief delight” (168). But more than this, 
he must reveal who he is through choice and 
thus merit his status as the “[o]nly begotten 
Son” (80). He must discern the will of God 
and then volunteer to renounce his place next 
to the Father (“I for [Man’s] sake will leave / 
Thy bosom, and this glory next to thee / Freely 
put off” [238–40]), demonstrating the lesson 
that he makes explicit in Paradise Regained: 
“who best / Can suffer, best can do; best reign, 
who first / Well hath obey’d” (3.194–96).
The Son also recognizes that mercy is as 
necessary to God as it is to Man, and he acts 
on the recognition. Without it, he observes, 
God’s “goodness and . . . greatness” would 
“[b]e question’d and blasphem’d without de-
fense” (165–66). But for reasons I will return 
to later, the Father alone cannot resolve the 
conflict between mercy and justice: he can 
“renew / [Man’s] lapsed powers” so that “once 
more he shall stand / On even ground against 
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his mortal foe,” but he cannot simply remit the 
death sentence that Man has incurred: “Die 
hee or Justice must” (175–76, 178–79, 210). 
Thus, he asks if there is in “all Heaven charity 
so dear” to “pay / The rigid satisfaction, death 
for death,” for Man’s crime (216, 211–12). Af-
ter a dramatic silence (“all the Heav’nly Choir 
stood mute . . . / And now without redemp-
tion all mankind / Must have been lost” [217, 
222–23]), the Son declares that “man shall find 
grace” and offers himself: “Behold mee then, 
mee for him, life for life / I offer, on mee let 
thine anger fall” (227, 236–37). Behind these 
lines stands another sacrificial offer, Nisus’s 
attempt to save the life of his friend Euryalus 
in book 9 of the Aeneid: “On me—on me—
here am I who did the deed—on me turn your 
steel, Rutulians!” (“me, me, adsum qui feci, in 
me converitite ferrum, / O Rutuli!”).7 Whereas 
Nisus tries to exchange his life for Euryalus’s 
after their two- man raid on the Rutulian 
camp gives way to a failed escape and retribu-
tion, the Son pledges his life to save Man, the 
collective identity of humanity. Nisus could 
have slipped off into the dark woods and saved 
himself, but the “one love” (“amor unus”; 
9.182) that unites the two Trojans compels 
him to risk, offer, and finally sacrifice his life 
for Euryalus. The Son, “[i]n whom the fullness 
dwells of love divine,” could have remained 
silent, but he offers himself “for Man, [to] be 
judg’d and die, / And dying rise, and rising 
with him raise / His Brethren” (225, 295–97).
Noting this parallel, Barbara Lewalski 
claims that it deliberately evokes the “deeds 
of bravery and self- sacrifice inspired by erotic 
love and noble friendship” to illustrate “how 
the Son’s heroic love transcends and trans-
values the heroic virtues and actions central 
to epic and romance” (116–17). But Milton, I 
would argue, is focused specifically on friend-
ship here: by fashioning the Son’s voluntary 
offer after Nisus’s willingness to die for his 
friend, he suggests that “Heroic Martyrdom” 
incorporates and transcends the ideal of self-
 sacrifice central to the classical friendship 
tradition: caritas subsumes amicitia (Paradise 
Lost 9.32). The highest expression of love, this 
tradition repeatedly asserts, is the willingness 
to die so that someone else might live.
The two pairs of classical friends who 
fueled this tradition—Orestes and Pylades 
and the young Pythagoreans Damon and 
Pythias—faced situations in which one 
friend was condemned to death but survived 
because of his companion’s loyalty and self-
 sacrifice. In De amicitia, Cicero locates such 
gestures in a cosmic context. Invoking the 
theory “that in nature and the entire universe 
whatever things are at rest and whatever are 
in motion are united by friendship and scat-
tered by discord,” Cicero has his spokesman 
Laelius continue:
And indeed this is a statement that all men 
not only understand but also approve. When-
ever, therefore, there comes to light some 
signal service in undergoing or sharing the 
dangers of a friend, who does not proclaim 
it with the loudest praise? What shouts re-
cently rang through the entire theater during 
the performance of the new play, written by 
my guest and friend, Marcus Pacuvius, at the 
scene where, the king being ignorant of which 
of the two was Orestes, Pylades, who wished 
to be put to death instead of his friend, de-
clared, “I am Orestes,” while Orestes contin-
ued steadfastly to assert, as was the fact, “I am 
Orestes!” The people in the audience rose to 
their feet and cheered this incident in fiction.
 (135; pt. 7, sec. 24)
Through their offer of self- sacrifice, both 
friends unwittingly demonstrate their har-
mony with the natural forces that give coher-
ence and order to the universe. The audience 
members celebrate the pair’s heroism because, 
Cicero maintains, they instinctively recognize 
that it embodies and exemplifies the concord 
that holds both human society and the natu-
ral world together.
Likewise, the Son’s offer to die for Man 
expresses his voluntary decision to conform to 
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the will of God and the law of nature. Milton 
always believed, as he tells Claudius Salmasius, 
“that the law of God does most closely agree 
with the law of nature” (Defensio 422), and 
in Paradise Lost the law of nature comprises 
the same forces that govern Cicero’s universe. 
When the Son rides out into Chaos “to create 
new Worlds,” he creates by imposing concord 
and amity on Chaos: “Silence, ye troubl’d 
waves, and thou Deep, peace, / Said then 
th’ Om ni fic Word, your discord end” (7.216–
17). At the same time, “on the wat’ry calm / His 
brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread,” 
an image that invokes the emblematic peace of 
the brooding halcyon as well as the dove,
And vital virtue infus’d, and vital warmth 
Throughout the fluid Mass, but downward  
  purg’d 
The black tartareous cold Infernal dregs 
Adverse to life; then founded, then conglob’d 
Like things to like, the rest to several place 
Disparted, and between spun out the Air, 
And Earth self- balanc’t on her Centre hung.
 (234–42)
The law of nature includes the bond of amity 
(“Like things to like”) that extends from the 
elements through the natural world to human 
society—a bond that degenerates as a conse-
quence of the Fall. Thus, after the flood restores 
the world to its original state, “not content / 
With fair equality, fraternal state,” Nimrod 
will “quite dispossess / Concord and the law of 
Nature from the Earth” (12.25–26, 28–29).
As both a creature and the instrument of 
subsequent creation, the Son has an excep-
tionally close relation to these laws: he is the 
medium through which discord is resolved 
into concord. Man’s disobedience not only 
introduces discord into human history, but 
it also alienates the Father and threatens to 
set him at odds with himself. He would like 
to show mercy to his “youngest son” but must 
enact justice (3.151): “Die hee or Justice must.” 
When the Son discerns this “strife / Of Mercy 
and Justice” in the Father’s “face,” he ends it 
by offering “himself to die / For man’s offence” 
(406–07, 409–10). After his sacrifice and final 
defeat of Death, he envisions returning “with 
the multitude of [his] redeem’d” to see the 
Father’s “face, wherein no cloud / Of anger 
shall remain, but peace assur’d, / And recon-
cilement” (260, 262–64). The Father confirms 
this prediction, praising the Son: “O thou in 
Heav’n and Earth the only peace / Found out 
for mankind under wrath, O thou / My sole 
complacence!” (274–76). In offering himself, 
the Son has cleared away the conflict from the 
Father’s countenance, preemptively atoned for 
mankind’s disobedience, and initiated the his-
torical process that will produce “New Heav’n 
and Earth” and the ultimate expression of 
union and concord, the time when “God shall 
be All in All” (335, 341). Like Pylades’s will-
ingness to sacrifice himself for Orestes, the 
Son’s pledge represents the apotheosis of the 
amity that animates the universe and prevents 
it from slipping back into Chaos. This demon-
stration of “immortal love” fills the angelic au-
dience with “Admiration,” and after the Father 
praises the Son’s offer and unveils the course 
of human history, they celebrate with “sacred 
Song . . . / No voice exempt, no voice but well 
could join / Melodious part, such concord is 
in Heav’n” (267, 271, 345–46, 370–71).
Thus, the judicial scene in book 3 invokes 
an episode familiar from the classical friend-
ship tradition: at the moment when a mon-
arch condemns a man to death, his friend 
intervenes to take the entire punishment on 
himself, and this heroic display of self less 
love compels the monarch to relent, saving 
them both. Milton foregrounds this dimen-
sion of the Son’s relation to Man in book 10, 
where God sends him to the garden as “Man’s 
Friend, his Mediator, his design’d / Both Ran-
som and Redeemer voluntary” (58–60). The 
Son’s act of “unexampled love” saves Man 
and establishes the pattern of self- sacrifice 
that classical friends and Christian martyrs 
will emulate (3.410)—the former by adhering 
to the laws of nature, the latter by  adhering 
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to Christ’s words “Greater love hath no man 
than this, that a man lay down his life for 
his friends” (Bible, John 15.13). Although 
Man and this “one greater Man” must pass 
through death to eternal life, the Son’s offer 
guarantees that both will live (1.4). It is also 
the act that declares him “by Merit more than 
Birthright Son of God, / Found worthiest to 
be so by being Good, / Far more than Great 
or High” (3.308–10). His friendship to Man 
justifies his anointment and the powers that 
he has already obtained, as well as those he 
will receive.
Rigid Satisfaction
But heroic displays of friendship do more than 
save and ennoble the individual friends: they 
have a transformative power that can convert 
tyrants into benevolent monarchs. The mu-
tual love of Orestes and Pylades, as Thomas 
Elyot observes in The Boke Named the Gov-
ernour, has just this effect: “Thus a long tyme 
they to gither contendinge, the one to die for 
the other, at last so relented the fierse and cru-
ell hart of the tyrant: that wondring at their 
marvailous frendship, he suffered them frely 
to depart, without doing them any damage” 
(152). The loyalty of Damon and Pythias has 
the same result:
Wherfore he desired the minister of justice to 
lose his fellow, and to prepare the execution on 
hym, that had given the occasion: wherat the 
tyraunt being all abashed commaunded bothe 
to be brought in his presence: and whan he had 
ynough wondered at their noble hartes and 
their constance in very frendship, he offring 
to them great rewards, desired them to receive 
hym into their company: and so doinge them 
moche honour, dyd set them at liberte. (153)
On a purely literary level, the Son’s offer pro-
duces a similar outcome. It enables God to 
transform himself from a vengeful to a for-
giving monarch, allowing his mercy to tran-
scend his justice. Indeed, the Father courts 
this transformation—or, more accurately, the 
revelation of his true character—to make Sa-
tan’s charge of “tyrant” ring false.
In his conduct, however, Milton’s God 
is closer to a constitutional monarch than to 
the tyrants who condemn classical friends. 
He has judged correctly and is constrained by 
his own integrity. To free himself and dem-
onstrate that he is great and good, he needs 
the Son to be both “Man’s friend” and “a sac-
rifice / Glad to be offer’d” (3.270). In Paradise 
Lost, Milton rejects the traditional Anselmian 
understanding of the atonement as a debt that 
Man owes to God, a debt that Christ must pay 
for him because he cannot pay it, and adopts 
a position similar to the one that Hugo Gro-
tius presents in De satisfactione Christi (1617): 
God rules creation as a political state and 
has an obligation to punish crimes against 
that state. As a creditor and injured party, he 
could remit the debt. As a sovereign, he can-
not allow crimes to go unpunished:
But yet all is not done; Man disobeying, 
Disloyal breaks his fealty, and sins 
Against the high Supremacy of Heav’n, 
Affecting God- head, and so losing all, 
To expiate his Treason hath naught left, 
But to destruction sacred and devote, 
He with his whole posterity must die, 
Die hee or Justice must; unless for him 
Some other able, and as willing, pay 
The rigid satisfaction, death for death. 
 (203–12)
Like Satan’s open rebellion against God, 
Adam and Eve’s disobedience is an act of 
treason. In return for abstaining from the 
fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, “[t]he Pledge 
of th[eir] Obedience and th[eir] Faith,” they 
are granted their “happy State”: their internal 
state of perfection, their state of bliss in the 
garden, and the political state (“thy Realm is 
large,” God tells Adam) that they have been 
given (8.325, 331, 375). By transgressing and 
“[a]ffecting God- head,” they are asserting 
their own absolute sovereignty over the states 
364 Beyond sacrifice: Milton and the atonement [ P M L A
 
with which they have been entrusted; they are 
claiming the offices that have been delegated 
to them as their own, seceding from union 
with God, and seeking to divide the indivis-
ible kingdom of creation. They sin against 
not just God but also the order of things, “the 
high Supremacy of Heav’n.” God must punish 
them or violate his own decrees, and violat-
ing the decrees would be to rule by personal 
whim, not law—the Aristotelian definition of 
a tyrant. But according to Roman public law, 
which is the theoretical framework that Gro-
tius uses in De satisfactione, God could alter 
the penalty and demand some other satisfac-
tion. As Shuger summarizes Grotius’s posi-
tion, “[I]n the Atonement, God exercises his 
imperium by relaxing the universal sentence 
of death the law imposed on humankind for 
the sin of Adam and substituting the Cruci-
fixion as a minatory exemplum” (59).
What is at stake for both Milton and 
Grotius is the morality of the atonement—
the morality of killing an innocent person for 
someone else’s crime. De satisfactione, Shuger 
demonstrates, attempts to ward off the Socin-
ian critique of the atonement—a rationalist 
rejection of mystical substitution—by dem-
onstrating that it conforms to the “rational 
principles of justice and fairness” epitomized 
by Roman public law (65). But this legal code 
allowed for penal substitution only for par-
ticular crimes, including treason and civil re-
volt, and under certain conditions: the victim 
must consent to be substituted for the other 
party, and the two parties must have a con-
nection to each other and thus have some 
kind of corporate identity. As Milton’s God 
stresses, the substitute must be “able, and 
as willing, [to] pay / The rigid satisfaction.” 
Shuger observes that Grotius, to support his 
argument, “searches outside the law for Clas-
sical precedent, reinterpreting the story of 
Damon and Pythias, for instance, not as an 
exemplum of true friendship—the standard 
Renaissance reading—but as evidence for the 
ancient practice of executing sureties if they 
failed to produce the accused in court” (73).8 
Pythias’s willingness to serve as the ransom 
and hostage that will guarantee Damon’s re-
turn, along with the shared identity produced 
by their friendship, satisfies the demands of 
Roman law, and their story provides a paral-
lel for the substitution of Christ for mankind. 
Milton turns to the friendship tradition—
echoing Nisus’s words, staging the heroic of-
fer, and declaring the Son “Man’s friend”—for 
the same reasons that Grotius does: to justify 
the atonement and the God who requires it.
Unexampled Love
In Paradise Lost, the Son’s offer, “Behold mee 
then, mee for him, life for life,” stands at the 
center of a series of heroic echoes. Satan’s 
willingness to risk Chaos and “unessential 
Night” on his voyage to the newly created 
world as the “last hope” of the fallen angels 
provides a disturbing parallel (2.439, 416). 
The dramatic situation follows the same pat-
tern—a call for a redeemer, silence, an offer, 
bent knees, praise, and a “firm concord” of 
the devils—and in the end Satan will be cru-
cified by the Son’s redemptive sacrifice (“But 
to the Cross he nails thy Enemies”; 2.497). But 
Adam and Eve’s echoes of the Son are more 
significant. As Milton writes in De doctrina, 
“[T]he effect and end of the whole mediatorial 
administration is the satisfaction of divine 
justice on behalf of all men, and the shaping 
of the faithful in the image of Christ” (443). 
This refashioning of the faithful begins with 
Adam and Eve’s repentance, which is itself 
enabled by prevenient grace. Adam’s accusa-
tions against God give way to the recognition 
of his own guilt and of the fact that his crime 
has doomed his future offspring. This admis-
sion leads Adam to the idea of self- sacrifice, 
something that he wistfully entertains but 
dismisses as impossible:
first and last
On mee, mee only as the source and spring
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Of all corruption, all blame lights due;
So might the wrath. Fond wish! (10.831–34)
Undeterred by Adam’s wrath toward her, Eve 
“besought / His peace,” seeking to take the 
entire death sentence upon herself:
[I] . . . to the place of judgment will return, 
There with my cries importune Heaven, that all 
The sentence from thy head remov’d may light 
On me, sole cause to thee of all this woe, 
Mee mee only just object of his ire. (931–36)
Of course, it is too late. Since they are both 
guilty, both have lost their immortality, and 
neither can offer to die for the other or their 
descendants. They have nothing with which 
to bargain: they are both dead. But just as the 
Son dispels the wrath and discord of the Fa-
ther with his voluntary offer of self- sacrifice, 
Eve’s offer brings “peace” and leads to her rec-
onciliation with Adam (who responds “with 
peaceful words”), which results in their re-
pentance and prayer (938, 946). She demon-
strates the virtues of the Son more fully than 
Adam does, and her embrace of “the better 
fortitude / Of Patience and Heroic Martyr-
dom” restores their relationship, which is a 
precondition for the Incarnation (9.31–32).
Earlier Eve describes Adam’s willing-
ness to eat the fruit and join her, whatever the 
punishment, as a “glorious trial of exceeding 
Love” (9.961). But the Son’s act of “unexampled 
love” provides a preemptive critique of Adam’s 
choice and establishes an alternative that is 
much closer to amicitia than eros. Adam fails 
his trial of love because he decides to die with 
Eve. He never imagines that he could die for 
her. Instead, he indulges in the narcissism 
of romantic love: like Romeo and Juliet, he 
would rather kill himself than live without his 
partner. Likewise, falling into another roman-
tic fallacy, Eve loves Adam so much that she 
would rather kill him than have him live with-
out her. Neither can imagine the kind of self-
 sacrificing love that Nisus exemplifies: “no, no, 
kill me instead.” Neither can imagine dying so 
that the other might live—without him or her. 
Once Eve has eaten the fruit, Adam is in the 
same position as Nisus, Pythias, and Pylades. 
His partner is condemned to death, and yet 
he still has his own life to offer instead. But 
he fails, “submitting to what seem’d remedi-
less” (919). As the word does in the reference 
to “other Worlds” in book 3, “seem’d” suggests 
that there are possibilities and alternatives 
that the poem cannot pursue. In book 9 it sug-
gests that there is a remedy that Adam over-
looks, and presumably—as C. S. Lewis and 
several subsequent critics have suggested—it 
is to offer his life for Eve’s.9 How this would 
work is unclear. Perhaps Adam’s offer would 
be enough to “pay / The rigid satisfaction” for 
Eve’s fall. Or perhaps, like the brothers Castor 
and Pollux, they would share one immortal 
life between them.
But the idea that Adam could have acted 
as Eve’s redeemer poses a theological prob-
lem. In orthodox Christianity, only God can 
play this role. Christ pays a debt no other be-
ing could because of the divinity he brings as 
God, and thus he performs a sacrifice that is 
unique and beyond comprehension and imita-
tion. This is the Christ of Herbert’s “The Sac-
rifice.” But this is not Milton’s theology. His 
distinction between the Father and the Son 
makes merit, not essence, the crucial factor:
[T]he Bible nowhere states that only God can 
approach God, or take away sin, or fulfil the 
law, or endure and overcome the anger of 
God, the power of Satan and temporal and 
eternal death, or recover the blessings lost by 
us. What it does state is that he whom God has 
empowered to do all this can do it: in other 
words, God’s beloved Son with whom God has 
declared himself pleased. (De doctrina 425)
The power to redeem is not an intrinsic char-
acteristic of the Son. It is something that the 
Father endows him with—just as he provides 
him with “the Chariot of Paternal Deity” for 
routing the rebel angels and with “golden 
Compasses” for circumscribing the universe 
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(6.750, 7.225). Presumably God could em-
power Adam, or another created being, to act 
as the redeemer. Indeed, if the Son were the 
only figure capable of redeeming Man, the 
scene where God asks for a volunteer to pay 
Man’s debt would be undercut:
Say Heav’nly Powers, where shall we find  
  such love, 
Which of ye will be mortal to redeem 
Mans mortal crime, and just th’ unjust to save, 
Dwells in all Heaven charity so dear? (3.213–16)
In his omniscience, God tells us that this sac-
rifice will be made, that someone will offer to 
do it. If the Son is the only figure capable of 
performing this task, he is being appointed to 
do it at this moment; he is being coerced into 
offering himself, and the drama of the scene 
is a disingenuous political spectacle like the 
one Satan and Beelzebub orchestrate in Hell. 
If someone else can offer—one of the angels, 
perhaps, as the passage suggests—then the 
Son’s offer is voluntary. After he has volun-
teered, God praises his singular heroism and 
announces the Incarnation: “Thou therefore 
whom thou only canst redeem, / Thir Nature 
also to thy Nature join” (281–82).
In Milton’s God, William Empson argues 
that God is wicked, Milton knew it, and Mil-
ton’s heresies work to mitigate that wicked-
ness.10 Whatever we conclude about Empson’s 
initial claim, Milton’s Arianism and, in Chris-
topher Hill’s words, his “abandonment of tra-
ditional ideas of Christ’s atonement” radically 
transform the individual’s relation to God 
(286). Milton turns away from the Passion for 
reasons quite different from those of Donne 
and Herbert. He rejects it as a spectacle that dis-
empowers the individual believer. By turning 
our gaze away from the suffering on Golgotha 
and directing our attention to the offer to “take 
me instead of him,” Milton privileges a mode of 
heroism that individuals can both contemplate 
and imitate—because Milton’s Arian theology 
brings Man closer to Christ at the same time 
as it distances the Son from God the Father. 
Instead of a scene that evokes human corrup-
tion, limitation, and irreparable debt, Milton 
offers an ethical decision—the self- sacrifice of 
Nisus writ large as heroic martyrdom—that 
encourages human agency. Is Christ’s sacri-
fice unique? For Milton it seems so because the 
Son offered to die for Man and became the re-
deemer, whereas Adam failed to offer himself 
for Eve. It seems so because these choices were 
made and our history has run its course. But on 
those stars that seem to be “other Worlds,” per-
haps other Eves will resist temptation and other 
Adams will not fall victim to what “seem’d re-
mediless.” For Milton the word “seem’d” takes 
on vast import: it suggests the unrealized alter-
natives that free his characters, his epic, and his 
God from the tyranny of necessity.
Notes
I am grateful to Elliott Visconsi for inviting me to pre sent 
an early version of this essay at the Medieval and Renais-
sance Colloquium at Yale University and to Kathleen 
Vejvoda, Steve Fallon, and John Rumrich for their gener-
ous responses to various drafts. I would also like to thank 
Heather Nabbefeld for her help with Melanchthon’s Latin.
1. Building on the work of Maurice Kelley, Bauman’s 
Milton’s Arianism persuasively argues that “Arian” is the 
most accurate term for Milton’s antitrinitarianism. “Sim-
ply put, if what was condemned at the council of Nicea 
was Arianism,” Bauman writes, “then John Milton was 
an Arian” (2). Also see Rumrich, “Milton’s Arianism.” 
Lieb argues against the validity of the term (261–78), but 
the objections that he raises are not new and have been 
either addressed or refuted by Bauman. For the initial 
reaction to the recovery of De doctrina, see Kelley, This 
Great Argument 3–7, and his introduction to De doctrina. 
Bauman, “Heresy,” demonstrates that a number of early 
readers of Paradise Lost suspected Milton of Arianism.
2. William B. Hunter first challenged Milton’s author-
ship of De doctrina in 1991 (“Provenance” and Visita-
tion). The committee assembled to address the resulting 
controversy recently confirmed Milton’s authorship of 
the treatise (Campbell et al.).
3. The subject of Paradise Regained—the temptation 
of Christ rather than his Passion—has long been taken 
as evidence of Milton’s discomfort with the Crucifixion 
and a sign that his theory of the atonement must be het-
erodox. See Rogers, “Milton’s Circumcision,” on Milton, 
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the Crucifixion, and the atonement; see Huttar for the 
problem of the Passion and Paradise Regained.
4. My trans. The original reads, “Unus est filius Dei, 
Do mi nus noster Iesus Christus, qui cum in hunc mun-
dum prodisset, tantum semel mortuus est, et resuscitatus. 
Nec alibi se ostendit, nec alibi mortuus aut resuscitatus 
est. Non igitur imaginandum est, plures esse mundos, 
quia nec imaginandum est, saepius Christum mortuum et 
re su sci ta tum esse, nec cogitandum est, in ullo alio mundo 
sine agnitione fili Dei, hominibus restitui vitam aeter-
nam” (folio 43). Also see McColley 412–13 and Dick 88–
89. In Donne and the New Philosophy, especially “Donne 
the Space Man” (78–128), Empson argues that Donne was 
inspired by the theological freedom of other worlds. C. S. 
Lewis explores extraterrestrial life in a Christian cos-
mos in his science fiction trilogy, Out of the Silent Planet 
(1938), Perelander (1943), and That Hideous Strength 
(1945), works influenced by his reading of Milton.
5. Tenure 198. See Rumrich, “Milton’s God,” for the 
relation between the imposition of order and tyranny; see 
Rogers, Matter 112–22, for the radical decentralization 
implicit in Milton’s animist materialism (or vitalism) and 
for its relation to political liberalism.
6. Strier convincingly argues that Milton has “a co-
herent ethical position” that is “distinctly classical rather 
than Christian” (258), but Strier does not connect Mil-
ton’s investment in dignity to his Arianism.
7. Virgil 9.427–28. Fowler and Leonard note this allu-
sion in their editions of Paradise Lost, as do earlier edi-
tors. Modeled after book 10 of the Iliad (the “Doloneia”), 
the Nisus and Euryalus episode influences later epics, in-
cluding Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso and Tasso’s Jerusalem 
Delivered. See Hardie 23–34.
8. Grotius writes, “So, too, in capital punishments 
the sureties were commonly put to death, if the defen-
dants did not appear (whence they are called antipsuchoi 
by the Greeks), as is sufficiently clear from, among other 
sources, that noble story of Damon and Pythias” (“Sic et 
in capitalibus iudiciis vades capite plecti solitos, si rei se 
non sisterent, unde Graecis αντιψυχοι appellantur, tum 
aliunde, tum ex nobili illa Damonis et Pythiae historia 
satis apparet”; 168–69; bk. 4, sec. 16]).
9. Lewis 121–24; Fish 261–72; Danielson, “Through 
the Telescope”; Leonard, Naming 213–32.
10. Although some of what Empson wrote has been 
qualified or superseded, one of his key insights remains 
valid: Milton’s heresies tend to “cut out of Christianity . . . 
the torture- horror” of the Crucifixion (269). For a rebut-
tal, see Danielson, Milton’s Good God.
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